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CALIFORNIA v. LARUE:
POLICE POWER AND THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
The California constitution vests an administrative agency, the
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, with primary authority
for the licensing of the sale of alcoholic beverages in that State and
with the power to suspend or revoke a liquor license if the agency
determines that continuation of the license would be contrary to
public welfare or morals.' In 1970, the Department promulgated
rules rcgulating the type of entertainment which might be presented
in licensed bars and night clubs. - Shortly before the effective date of
the regulations, various holders of state liquor licenses were joined
by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control in requesting the
federal district court to determine whether the regulations were in-
valid under the United States Constitution.3 The district court upheld
the claim of the license holders that the regulations in question un-
constitutionally abridged the freedom of expression guaranteed to
them by the first4 and fourteenth amendmentss to the United States
Constitution. The district court reasoned that the state regulations
had to be justified either as a prohibition of obscenity in accordance
with the Roth v. United States6 line of Supreme Court decisions, 7 or
as a regulation of "conduct" having a communicative element under
the standards laid down by the Supreme Court in United States v.
1. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22 (1970).
2. In essence, the regulations sought to prohibit explicitly sexual live enter-
tainment and films in bars and other establishments licensed to dispense liquor
by the drink. CAL. ADmIN. CODE tit. 4, §§ 143.2, 143.3, 143.4, 143.5 (1970).
3. Initially the license holders had unsuccessfully sought discretionary review
of the rules in both the state court of appeals and in the Supreme Court of
California. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 112 (1972).
4. LaRue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 348, 358 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
5. Id.
6. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7. See Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S.
372 (1958).
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O'Brien.8 Concluding that the regulations would bar some entertain-
ment which could not be called obscene under Roth,9 and that the
governmental interest being furthered by the regulations did not
meet the tests laid down in O'Brien-o the court enjoined enforcement
of the regulations."
In California v. LaRue,12 the United States Supreme Court, on
appeal, reversed the district court's decision. Speaking for the major-
ity, Justice Rehnquist agreed with the lower court's finding that the
Department's regulations, on their face, would proscribe activity,
some of which would not be found obscene under Roth and would
restrict some "communication" which would be within the limits of
the constitutional protection of freedom of expression.' 3 Yet the
majority did not agree that the regulations were therefore rendered
unconstitutional. Justice Rehnquist contended that the district court
had not given proper consideration to the fact that the challenged
regulations were licensing laws,"' and that in the area of liquor licens-
ing the scope of the police power was extremely broad because of the
passage of the twenty-first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion'5 and the manner in which that amendment had been inter-
preted.'6 The Court concluded that there is an "added presumption"
8. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
9. The basic test of obscenity affirmed in Roth is "[w]hether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." 354 U.S. at 489.
10. [A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the con-
s tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-pression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment Freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance ofthat interest.
391 U.S. at 377.
11. Laue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
12. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
13. Id. at 116, 118.
14. Licensing laws are enacted pursuant to the police power. In the majority
opinion, Justice Rehnquist cites this general power of states and municipalities
authorizing legislation in furtherance of the public health, welfare and morals,
Id. at 114.
15. § 1-"The eighteenth article of amendment t t he Constitution is hereby
repealed."§ 2-"The transportation or importation into any State ... for.., use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby pro-hibited."
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §§ 1, 2.
16. 409 U.S. at 115-16.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/30
POLICE POWER
in favor of the validity of state regulation in the area of liquor con-
trol which is required by the twenty-first amendment 7 and that, given
such a presumption, the California regulations on their face could not
be held to violate the United States Constitution.'"
Does the history of liquor licensing in America justify the "added
presumption" argument, as applied in California v. LaRue? Crowley
v. Christensen,'19 a case decided by the United States Supreme Court
in 1890, developed the basic assertion that control of the liquor busi-
ness falls within the scope of traditional police powers.20 In affirming
the constitutionality of a San Francisco liquor license ordinance, the
Court in Crowley relied solely on the broad police power of a state
or municipality: "The police power of the State is fully competent to
regulate the business-to mitigate its evils or to suppress it entirely."2'
Yet despite the Supreme Court's strong defense of local liquor
regulations enacted pursuant to the police power, the judiciary was
unwilling to uphold the constitutionality of state laws which affected
the interstate transportation of liquor. The Court recognized that
when the United States Government was established, the states had
surrendered control over the regulation of interstate commerce by
adopting a constitution which delegated this authority to the federal
government. '-' Thus, in Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.,23
the Supreme Court found an Iowa statute, which forbade common
carriers to bring liquor into the State, to be in conflict with the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution.24
The appellant in Bowman had argued that the right of the state,
under the police power, to restrict intoxicating liquor within its
17. Id. at 118-19.
18. Id.
19. 137 U.S. 86 (1890).
20. The states have consistently held that the regulation of intoxicants is a
valid exercise of its police power. This police power stands upon the basic
principle that some rights must be and are surrendered or modified in enter-
ing into the social and political state as indispensable to the good govern-
ment and due regulation and well being of society.
7 IDAHO L. Rlv. 131, 132 (1970). See 9 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 26 (3d ed. 1964). See generally 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 174-98
(1956).
21. 137 U.S. at 91.
22. "The Congress shall have Power . . [To regulate Commerce . . . among
the several States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
23. 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
24. Id. at 499.
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borders implied the correlative right to control the importation of
liquor, since the latter was necessary to the effective exercise of the
former.2 5 The Court, in rejecting this argument, acknowledged that
the purpose of the law was merely "protecting its people against the
evils of intemperance," 26 and that extending the powers of the state
beyond its territorial limits would be very convenient and useful.21
But the Court refused to create an exception to the Constitution
simply because a restriction on intoxicants was involved: "If the
State of Iowa may prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquors
... it may also include ... any other article... it may deem delete.
rious." 28 Unwilling to establish such a precedent, the Court voided
the law. Many state legislators objected to the Court's decision as a
severe limitation on the ability of a state to enforce newly-passed
prohibition laws .2
The passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act 3o in 1913 represented a
crucial change in the law as evidenced by its subheading: An Act
Divesting Intoxicating Liquors of Their Interstate Character in Cer-
tain Cases.3 1 The Webb-Kenyon Act was held to be a constitutional
exercise of the power of Congress to permit state regulation of liquor
in interstate commerce.32 Congress had done what the Court in Bow.
man felt it could not do: amplify the police power of the state to per-
mit the liquor industry to be regulated free from the restrictions of
the commerce clause.33
25. Id. at 498-99.
26. Id. at 493.
27. Id. at 499.
28. Id. at 494.
29. See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmERICA 275 (ann. ed.
1964).
30. "The . . . transportation . . . [of any] intoxicating liquor . . . from one
State . .. into any other State ... [in] which . .. intoxicating liquor is intended
to be .. .used ... in violation of any law of such State . . . is prohibited." 27
U.S.C. § 122 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 1, 1913, ch. 90, 37 Stat.
699).
31. The only previous legislation of note was the Wilson Act, which permitted
state laws to regulate interstate shipment of liquor after arrival at its destination,
27 U.S.C. § 121 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 8, 1890, ch. 728, 26
Stat. 313). But the Act was not interpreted as having altered the illegality of
attempted state regulation of liquor while in interstate commerce. See CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmERICA 275 (ann. ed. 1964).
32. James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
33. See Barbour v. Georgia, 249 U.S. 454 (1919); Crane v. Campbell, 245
U.S. 304 (1917); Seaboard Airline Ry. v. North Carolina, 245 U.S. 298 (1917);
Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U.S. 190 (1915).
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The Webb-Kenyon Act seemed to lose its significance in 1920 when
the federal government, pursuant to the eighteenth amendment to
the Constitution,34 imposed a national prohibition on alcoholic bever-
ages.35 After fourteen troubled years, however, the attempt at nation-
wide control of liquor was discarded. 36 The Seventy-fourth Congress
of the United States debated at length the problem of liquor legisla-
tion37 before proposing for ratification the twenty-first amendment
to the Constitution. The eighteenth amendment had shifted regu-
latory power away from the states and toward the federal govern-
ment.38 Senator Blaine, the initial sponsor of the twenty-first amend-
ment, stated that his proposal was a restoration of power to the
states, "[T]he right to regulate commerce respecting a single com-
modity-namely, intoxicating liquor."3 9 He explained that the amend-
ment was intended "to assure the so-called dry States against the
importation of intoxicating liquor into those states . . . to write
permanently into the Constitution a prohibition along that line."4
Congressional debates do not indicate that Senator Blaine, or any of
the supporters of the twenty-first amendment, intended the proposal
to be a grant of new power to the states in the area of liquor regula-
tion. The legislative purpose, rather, was to revitalize the basic police
34. "[T]he .. . sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within . . . the
United States ... for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST.
amend. XVIII, § 1.
35. [Tjhe eighteenth amendment would never have been adopted had it notbeen for the open, brazen, corrupt, persistent defiance of the laws of dry States
by the liquor interests outside those States. At the time the eighteenth
amendment was adopted, 33 States had prohibition in some form. The people
had declared they wanted to be rid of this evil ....
76 CONG. REc. 4172 (1933) (remarks of Senator Borah).
36. The Volstead Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 83, 41 Stat. 305, adopted to en-
force the eighteenth amendment, was rendered inoperative by the ratification
in 1933 of the twenty-first amendment to the Constitution. See generally 76 CONG.
Rac. 64-4225 (1933).
37. See generally 76 CoNG. REc. 64-4225 (1933).
38. "The problem confronting us . .. is to choose between two alternative
courses. Either the control of ...liquor traffic is to remain in the federal Gov-
ernment or is to be restored to the States." 76 CONG. Rxc. 4148 (1933) (remarks
of Senator Wagner). This was true despite the fact that in McCormick & Co.
v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131 (1932), the Court had observed that the Webb-Kenyon
Act had been neither repealed nor modified by the eighteenth amendment and,
as a result, states could continue to regulate interstate commerce in intoxicating
liquors. Id. at 140, 141.
39. 76 CoNrG. REC. 4141 (1933).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
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power of the states as augmented by the Webb-Kenyon Act and to
remove this power from the shadows of Prohibition by recasting the
power in the form of a constitutional amendment.41
The first significant judicial test of the twenty-first amendment
came in State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co.42 Cali-
fornia had, pursuant to the new amendment, imposed a license fee
on importers of liquor into the State. The United States Supreme
Court observed that the fee was a direct, state-imposed burden on
interstate commerce inconsistent with the commerce clause 43 but
upheld the law under the twenty-first amendment.44 The decision
thus acknowledged that congressional enactments, beginning with
the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts and culminating in the passage
of the twenty-first amendment, had broadened the police power in the
area of liquor legislation to extend to state action which otherwise
would have been precluded by the commerce clause.45 Young's Market
could therefore be read as a judicial assertion that the twenty-first
amendment, as an addition to the Constitution, gave legislation
regulating liquor an "added presumption of validity," which arises
when such legislation is challenged under the commerce clause.4 0 But
Justice Rehnquist in California v. LaRue suggests that the Court in
Young's Market felt that the twenty-first amendment may have
broadened the power to control alcohol in terms of the entire Con-
stitution.47
41. Compare note 15 supra with note 30 supra. In further support of the
argument that the amendment was intended as a constitutional incorporation of
the act, see, e.g., Dugan v. Bridges, 16 F. Supp. 694, 706 (D.N.H. 1936); de
Ganahl, The Scope of Federal Power Over Alcoholic Beverages Since the Twenty-
First Amendment, 8 GEO. WAsH. L. Rav. 819, 822-23 (1940); Johnson & Kessler,
The Liquor License System-Its Origin and Constitutional Development, 15
N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 380, 418 (1938); Kallenbach, Interstate Commerce in In-
toxicating Liquors under the Twenty-First Amendment, 14 TEMP. L.Q. 474, 476
(1940); 38 COLUm. L. REv. 644 (1938); 50 HARV. L. REv. 353, 354 (1936).
42. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
43. The State conceded that the fee was imposed strictly for the privilege of
importing within its borders.
44. 299 U.S. at 62.
45. See, e.g., Note, The Twenty-First Amendment Grants States Plenary
Power over the Liquor Industry Notwithstanding the Dictates of the Equal
Employment Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 HoUSTON L. Rxv.
587 (1971); Note, The Twenty-First Amendment Versus the Interstate Com-
merce Clause, 55 YALE L.J. 815 (1946).
46. See The Twenty-First Amendment Versus the Interstate Commerce Clause,
supra note 45.
47. 409 U.S. at 114-15.
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In Young's Market the Court had replied to the appellee's equal
protection argument that: "IT]he Twenty-First Amendment cannot
be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth."48 Yet the Court plainly
indicated that it was not implying that the twenty-first amendment
freed states and municipalities in this area of regulation from com-
pliance with other constitutional limitations on the police power.49
In addition, that Court made it clear that the fourteenth amendment
challenge was not simply being voided because the twenty-first amend-
ment was involved. The Court had found, rather, that the California
law, as specifically applied, was reasonable and therefore did not vio-
late the fourteenth amendment.50
In three subsequent cases upholding state liquor importation
statutes, the Supreme Court cited Young's Market as controlling.51
A trend away from reliance on the twenty-first amendment, however,
was signaled in Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves 2 In Ziffrin, though sustaining
a Kentucky liquor law against the same objections raised in Young's
Market, the Court chose to defend the Kentucky act as being simply
"within the police power of the state,"5 3 and did not mention the
Young's Market opinion. Even in cases in which the challenge to
liquor regulations rested on the commerce clause alone, the Court
either ignored-' or disregarded-3 the twenty-first amendment in sus-
taining such regulations under the police power.
Judicial restraints upon the twenty-first amendment were furthered
in the 1940's by a number of important cases., Following these deci-
48. 299 U.S. at 64.
49. The plaintiffs insist that to sustain the exaction of the importer's
license-fee would involve a declaration that the Amendment has, in respect
to liquor, freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power to be
found in other provisions of the Constitution. The question for decision
requires no such generalization.
299 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added).
50. 299 U.S. at 64.
51. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing
Co. v. Liquor Control Conm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939); Mahoney v. Joseph
Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938).
52. 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
53. Id. at 139.
54. Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941).
55. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944).
56. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (twenty-first amendment did
not enter into an equal protection argument regarding the hiring of female
bartenders); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945)
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sions the Supreme Court heard no noteworthy cases in the area until
1964.57 In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.68 the Court
reaffirmed the rule that under the twenty-first amendment states and
municipalities have broad power to regulate transportation of in-
toxicants through their territory.5 9 Yet, in overturning an injunction
brought by the New York State Liquor Authority, the Court found
the commerce clause, not the twenty-first amendment, to be con-
trolling.60 In Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling
Co.,61 a law enacted pursuant to the twenty-first amendment was
found by the Court to be in conflict with the export-import clause
of the Constitution. 62
A 1966 case, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter,3 dis-
tinguished Idlewild and Beam, however, and upheld state liquor
regulation under the twenty-first amendment as placing no uncon-
stitutional burden on interstate commerce. 04 In citing, among others,
the decision in Young's Market, the Supreme Court in Seagram
seemed anxious to re-establish the notion that the twenty-first amend-
ment represents a constitutional broadening of police power in that
area of liquor regulation which might otherwise be controlled by the
(twenty-first amendment did not affect a suit being brought under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act); Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944)
(twenty-first amendment did not justify state confiscation of liquor being shipped to
a military reservation); Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518
(1938) (twenty-first amendment did not extend a state's jurisdiction into a
national park); Barnett v. Bowles, 151 F.2d 77 (Emer. Ct. App. 1945) (twenty-
first amendment did not limit federal price controls, pursuant to the war power,
on retail sales of liquor).
57. See Note, The Evolving Scope of State Power Under the Twenty-First
Amendment: The 1964 Liquor Cases, 19 RuTGORs L. Rav. 759 (1965).
58. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
59. Id. at 330.
60. Id. at 332. "Both the Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clauses
are part of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each
must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and
interests at stake in any concrete case." Id. at 334. The Court concluded that the
commerce clause controlled. Justice Rehnquist in LaRue quotes this passage from
Idlewild to illustrate the strength of state regulation under the twenty-first amend-
ment. 409 U.S. at 115.
61. 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
62. Id. at 346.
63. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
64. Id. at 41.
65. Id. at 42.
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commerce clause. Seagram thus revived the basic contention of
Young's Market that the twenty-first amendment gives to legislation
regulating liquor an "added presumption of validity" which arises
when such legislation is challenged under the commerce clause. This
"presumption," though dearly not irrebuttable does deserve con-
sideration in any case involving state or municipal regulation of in-
toxicating beverages.
It is, therefore, not surprising that Justice Rehnquist in California
v. LaRue raised the issue of an "added presumption of validity" in
the area of liquor legislation.66 Yet nothing in the history of this field
would suggest that the "presumption" is applicable, except where
liquor regulations are challenged under the commerce clause. The
Court's attempt in California v. LaRue to extend the "presumption
of validity" to liquor legislation which has nothing to do with the
commerce clause is neither justified by the twenty-first amendment
nor by those cases which have interpreted the amendment.
Laws controlling intoxicating liquor, like any other legislation
enacted pursuant to the police power, must reasonably comply with
the constitutional limitations imposed on the exercise of such power.67
The Supreme Court has consistently held that even though a gov-
ernmental purpose may be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that stifle fundamental liberties when
the end could be more narrowly achieved.,s In his dissenting opinion
in California v. LaRue, Justice Marshallr9 applied this test to the
California liquor regulations and found that the regulations were
unconstitutional because "over-broad,"' O as applicable on their face,
to "scantilly clad ballet troupes" as they are to "Bacchanalian rev-
elries."' 1 Justice Marshall concluded that the regulations lacked the
precision which is required when first amendment rights are in-
volved.72 Yet Justice Rehnquist, despite his concession that the
66. 409 U.S. at 118-19.
67. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
H-ornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
68. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
69. 409 U.S. at 123.
70. Id. at 125.
71. Id. at 125 n.3.
72. Id. at 125-26. See generally Freund, Competing Freedoms in American
Constitutional Law, 13 U. CHI. CONF. SEa. 26, 32-33 (1953), Richardson, Free-
dom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 6, 23-24(1951).
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regulations on their face do proscribe "communication," some of
which is protected by the first amendment, affirmed the California
rules, even though "specific future applications of the statute may
engender concrete problems of constitutional dimension."73
The Court'swillingness to uphold the regulations, despite the strong
contention that they are "overbroad," rests on the mistaken belief
that simply because the California laws seek to control the use of
alcoholic beverages they are entitled to an "added presumption of
validity."' r By affirming on their face California's new liquor licens-
ing laws, the Supreme Court in California v. LaRue has greatly
broadened the potential power of state and municipal liquor licens-
ing agencies to legislate, not only pursuant to the police power but
perhaps free from the limitations which the Court and the Consti-
tution had heretofore placed upon that power.75
Gary H. Feder
73. 409 U.S. at 119 n.5 citing Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter,
384 U.S. 35, 52 (1966).
74. 409 U.S. at 118-19.
75. See Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d. 405, 509 P.2d 497, 107 Cal. Rptr.
681 (1973).
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